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This report would not have been possible without the dedication and active 
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and contributions are the basis of this report. Each presenter prepared and delivered a 
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In particular, we would like to acknowledge Mr. David Hamon and Ms. Jennifer Perry, 
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execution of this workshop. Three NPS students, Major Gustav Jordt (USAF), Lieutenant 
Commander Jason Neal (USN) and Captain Laura Perrazola (USMC) were integral in the 
execution of the event. These dedicated students and officers served as panel chairs, 
discussion facilitators, note takers, and they helped to write significant portions of this 
workshop report. Matthew Dearing co-produced the conference report with Jessica 
Piombo. 
 
All opinions and factual errors in this report are the authors’ own.  Please direct any 
questions either to the specific panelists or to the project lead, Jessica Piombo 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The workshop titled Reducing Insecurity in Africa: Roles and Responsibilities of the U.S. Military, 
U.S. Government and Non-Government Communities was held in Monterey, California in 
December 2010. Sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and hosted by the Naval 
Postgraduate School, this conference focused on the respective roles of military, government 
civilian, and non-governmental actors in bridging security and development processes in Africa.  
 
We organized this conference because of the debates that had been ignited over the creation 
of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in February 2007. An expansive conception of 
security and the roles that military actors should take in providing security informed the early 
deliberations over AFRICOM’s roles and missions.  AFRICOM’s creators proclaimed that it would 
be a new kind of combatant command, one that took a “whole of government” approach to 
Africa, and one in which the Department of Defense (DoD) working in close collaboration with 
the Department of State (DoS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
and other partners. AFRICOM would engage in a wide range of activities that extended far 
beyond the narrow confines of national security, and it would attempt to take an extremely 
proactive stance in responding to and working with African concerns. To AFRICOM, security 
included not just the traditional concepts of state-centric national security conceived of in 
military terms (arms rivalries, strategic alliances, defense and military training), but also 
dimensions of human security: individual security and human rights, economic prosperity, 
societal reconstruction and stabilization, regional organization development, and capacity 
building for states and their institutions.  
 
The attention that AFRICOM devoted to capacity building and related programs therefore 
sparked intense debate. Many were concerned about the “securitization” or militarization of 
U.S. policy in Africa; others were concerned about the blurring of boundaries between 
development and security programs; and a final set found the interagency aspect of AFRICOM’s 
new orientation troubling. Without assessment of the command as it has been operating, 
however, these discussions remain at the conceptual level and tend to circle around the same 
sets of unresolved arguments. Therefore, we initiated this conference in order to generate 
concrete discussion of the nature of security and insecurity in Africa, how to address those 
problems, and assess the programs that AFRICOM has initiated that bridge the development-
security divide.  
 
Process 
In June 2010, we issued a call for papers. The solicitations went to academics, U.S. government 
civilians, U.S. military organizations, and non-governmental organizations, both within and 
outside the USA. We aimed to bring together individuals from various communities who had 
interacted with AFRICOM or had experience with their programs, and who desired to reflect on 
their experiences by assessing the command’s activities in three areas. We received over 100 
applications and selected approximately 25 papers to be presented at the conference. Our final 
participant list included individuals from USAID, the State Department, the U.S. military, think 
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tanks, universities in the USA and Africa, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  Each 
participant wrote a conference paper that was made available to participants before the 
workshop, presented and discussed in a three-day event.  
 
The conversations across these various communities yielded a set of findings and 
recommendations for how to address the lines between various actors within the U.S. 
government, how to create programs that build on the complementarities between various 
actors (within and outside the government), and what recurring issues continually challenge the 
generation of productive interactions between these different actors. The highlights are 
presented below, and more expansive descriptions of the panels, presentations and discussions 
are found within the full conference report.  The papers are being collected into an edited 




On the Nature of Stability and Security in Africa... 
1. Traditional notions of security based upon upholding the rationale of state borders do 
not hold sway in most African contexts, and governments and governance deficits cause 
many of Africa’s security challenges.  Considering security at the human level can move 
past problems rooted in bad governance, uneven development, exclusion, and rights 
abuses at the state level. 
2. The "developmental challenge" in addressing insecurity in Africa takes two main forms. 
The first is addressing the economic and governance issues that create human and 
state-level insecurities. The second is the need to build up the human, institutional and 
infrastructural capacity within African security actors, agencies and sectors. 
3. Stability is dependent upon the mutually constitutive elements of security, governance, 
and development. Many feel that each of these dimensions is best addressed by specific 
actors, but that the interconnectedness of these three necessitates that actors work 
together to create a synergistic outcome. This is the essence of the "whole of 
government" approach to security and development.  
On the Nature of Coordination among USG Programs and Actors... 
  
1. One of the biggest challenges for interagency coordination is the complexity among 
interagency organizational structures, cultures, time-horizons, funding and staffing 
levels, operating procedures and mandates. Despite knowledge of these issues across 
various agencies, they still continue to impair working relationships. Knowing the nature 
of the coordination problem has yet to translate into enduring and institutionalized (i.e., 
not ad hoc) solutions.    
o Communication problems particularly impact the development of interagency 
relationships. Along with having difficulties speaking the same language, 
agencies need to actually open the lines of communication between each other.  
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Misperceptions exist in regards to organizational capabilities and programs 
between each agency.  
o Different organizational traits and cultures also create serious challenges when 
U.S. military, USG civilian and non-governmental actors attempt to cooperate. 
More productive ends with less waste can be created when various actors make 
the effort to learn how to work together and alter their processes to facilitate 
coordination.   
§ AFRICOM has seen success in creating cooperation across USG agencies 
in health programs when the military side has consciously sought to 
modify its programs to more closely align with USAID processes and 
expectations. This can serve as an example for other programs.  
2. The expansion of the civil affairs and capacity building missions within AFRICOM have 
been viewed as an encroachment into what was seen by many in the diplomatic and 
development communities as their exclusive roles.  
o There are serious concerns from the Department of State, USAID and NGOs 
about the fact that U.S. military personnel are not trained in development or 
true capacity and institution building, that the DoD does not have the time 
horizon built into its programs that true development projects necessitate, and 
that the DoD engages in “developmental” activities for strategic ends.  
o These differences are part of why integration, or at least cooperation and 
coordination, are necessary to create layered programs that will have lasting 
effects in truly addressing African security challenges. 
o The question often arises, however, of who should lead coordination. Some feel 
that AFRICOM can serve as an essential organization to coordinate and facilitate 
future US-led stabilization projects in Africa. Others are less convinced, and the 
inability of AFRICOM’s leadership to generate a clear purpose and mission for 
the command has made it more difficult to find resolution on this.  
3. Chronic imbalances in human and financial resources between the three main USG 
agencies (the DoD, Department of State, and USAID) deeply impair the ability to 
generate cooperative relationships, particularly the development and deployment of 
programs and the sharing of information. These issues are un-changeable in the short 
term and must therefore be planned for and worked around, while executive and 
legislative channels are worked to remedy the situation in the longer term.  
 
Recommendations 
1. “Coordinate but differentiate.” Actors should each work in their areas of expertise and 
to their comparative advantage, while integrating into an overall coordinated project. 
When AFRICOM makes the effort to coordinate and differentiate, as it has in health 
programs, productive outcomes can be achieved.  
o The DoD will need to acknowledge where and when other agencies should be in 
the lead, and develop strategies to support their efforts rather than attempt to 
replace them.  
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o Aligning DoD programs with existing and planned initiatives pursued by USAID 
and DoS can help to provide a long-term outlook to defense programs, despite 
personnel and funding fluctuations.  
o Actors that work in this arena need to develop a common lexicon, at best, or at 
minimum, a more sustained awareness that terms and concepts are not 
universal.  
2. AFRICOM staff should work within the DoD to fix the structural issues that limit 
interaction with civilians and NGOs.   
3. Ultimately, the resource imbalance between civilian and military agencies will have to 
be addressed for sustained cooperation. 
o DoD actors often assume that DoS and USAID personnel do not want to go on 
assignment with the military or cooperate with military-led programs. Our 
participants noted that lack of cooperation is often not an issue of will but of 
resources and rules. This may be due to bureaucratic issues related to resource 
levels, funding/spending constraints, career incentives, and the timelines and 
processes of civilian appointments. A better understanding of the processes and 
constraints of each agency would help the various actors find ways to work with 
or around these potential constraints.  
4. Civilian agencies will eventually need to generate career incentives that motivate their 
staff to accept assignments at AFRICOM and other combatant commands, in order to 
encourage and facilitate regular exchanges between staffs.  
 
Concluding Thoughts and Way Forward 
The fact that our participants engaged in frank discussions of what has worked and what 
continues to hinder interagency cooperation, and that they then could take this experience 
back to their home agencies, was the first and most important outcome of this workshop. A 
second significant success was that the participants aired their opinions and listened to each 
others’ perspectives. Even when they disagreed, learning why disagreements surfaced helped 
advance mutual understanding.  
 
Finally, the consistency of coordination challenges uncovered, and the discovery of some 
successes in ways of engaging across agencies and with African partners, was important. 
Participants noted that none of their findings were “path breaking” in the sense that none had 
been aware of them previously. But the consistency of the issues that arose, regardless of the 
type of program being analyzed, was marked. 
 
Given this, the panelists felt it is time to move beyond the rhetoric of noting problems and to 
identify and institutionalize non-ad hoc ways of engaging productively across the range of 
actors - governmental and non-governmental - to enhance both U.S. and African security at the 









AFRICOM   United States Africa Command 
AOR    Area of Responsibility 
APS    Africa Partnership Station 
CA    Civil Affairs  
CJTF-HOA   Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa 
COIN    Counter Insurgency 
DATT    Defense Attache 
DoD    Department of Defense 
DoS    Department of State 
DRC    Democratic Republic of Congo 
DTRA    Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
ECOWAS   Economic Community of West African States 
FSO    Foreign Service Officer 
HA    Humanitarian Assistance 
HAO    Humanitarian Assistance Other 
HCA    Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 
HoA    Horn of Africa 
IUU    Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (Fishing) 
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO    Non-governmental Organization 
OEF-TS    Operation Enduring Freedom, Trans Sahara 
PRP    Pandemic Response Program 
PRT    Provincial Reconstruction Team 
SOCAFRICA / SOCAF  Special Operations Command Africa 
SCRAT    Sociocultural Analysis Team 
SSR    Security Sector Reform 
TOC    Transnational Organized Crime 
TSC    Theater Security Cooperation 
TSCTP    Trans Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership 
USA    United States Army 
USAID    United States Agency for International Development 
USG    United States Government 
USMC    United States Marine Corps 
USN    United States Navy 
USSOF    United States Special Operations Forces 
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CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVES OF THE WORKSHOP  
 
In December 2010, the Naval Postgraduate School hosted a workshop that assessed the 
various roles played by different actors involved in projects that span the nexus 
between development and security in Africa.  The project was supported by the 
Advanced Systems and Concepts Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA-
ASCO), which at the time ran a separate, parallel project on mapping and projecting the 
terrain of non-traditional security threats in Africa. The workshop that NPS convened 
oriented from the following basic issue: in regions where any efforts to reduce 
insecurity will fail without addressing fundamental issues such as poverty, inequality, 
corruption and poor governance, what are the respective roles of military, non-military 
governmental, and non-governmental actors? Where does “development” end and 
“security and stabilization” begin?   
 
The motivation for this workshop came from the diverse reactions to the creation of the 
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM or U.S. Africa Command). In February 2007, 
U.S. Africa Command was announced with much fanfare, and its initial planners claimed 
that the command would take a new, fresh, "holistic" approach to U.S. government 
efforts in Africa (sentiment found in the earlier, more expansive statements about the 
command), or at least in the realm of African security assistance (in the later, more 
reserved pronouncements). Yet the United States military’s non-kinetic, development-
based approach to engaging with African countries was quickly and widely criticized by 
development experts, the NGO community, and observers wary of militarizing U.S. 
foreign policy in Africa. The questions feed into a meta-debate about whether the 
choice is development or security, or whether U.S. foreign policy seeks to create 
development for security.  
 
In an environment where most security problems are complex issues, development and 
security are deeply intertwined. What then is the role of the U.S. military in Africa and 
what are suitable military approaches to African security? Defining the roles and 
responsibilities of various actors – U.S. military, U.S. government non-military, 
international organizations, non-governmental organizations – becomes part and parcel 
of defining the challenge of finding sustainable and long-term solutions to the political 
and regional instabilities that plague Africa and prevent the continent from truly 
realizing its full potential for economic and political development. This workshop 
investigated these various issues through a set of solicited papers that were presented 
in a small, participation-focused workshop format.  
 
Given the amount of time that had passed, the conference organizers felt that we were 
at a timely point to re-engage the roles and responsibilities debate. There were concrete 
experiences to analyze about where and how the respective U.S. government and non-
governmental actors have been operating in the new policy landscape. In this spirit, the 
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workshop attempted to focus on completed activities, identifying the various actors 
who have engaged in programs to address security concerns through engagements that 
span the development-security divide. Participants were largely self-identified: in June - 
July 2010, we issued a call for proposals and received over 90 paper abstracts. Of these, 
approximately 25 were selected for presentation at the workshop.  
 
Day one laid the groundwork and set the terms of debate for the following two days. 
Presenters were sought from the academic and practitioner communities, to present 
context-setting papers that would facilitate discussions about the nature of security 
issues in Africa; to sort through the human versus traditional security debate; assess 
how the changing nature of war and conflict blurs the line between the two types of 
security; and finally to analyze what this means for the distinction between 
development and security.  
 
The presentations and discussions on this day focused on the specific issues just raised.  
This day's panels were primarily conducted at the conceptual and academic levels, 
framing the debate in terms of the linkages between development and security, what 
development requires to be effective (time horizon, local ownership, relationship 
building, etc), and whether there are "shortcuts" to ensure security can be effective 
without adhering to all the lessons of development.  
 
Day two moved the discussion into the realm of concrete experience. Presenters on this 
day were asked to utilize the frameworks developed in the papers that were presented 
on the first day to structure their contributions. The presentations and papers on the 
second day focused on the practical nature of how engagements unfold on the ground, 
and what effects these engagements contribute to the security-development nexus. 
When planning projects that aim to reduce insecurity through development, how do 
project implementers keep these mutual, but separate goals in mind? How do 
practitioners measure the impact of their projects, and what measures have they taken 
to integrate efforts across the various communities?  
 
Day three attempted to filter the debates from the first two days into a coherent set of 
practical lessons in terms of how development and security tie together, in what 
circumstances cooperation works, and what circumstances produce unbridled 
competition and negative results. Participants gathered into small working groups, each 
focusing on an issue raised in the papers. The working groups were tasked with 
identifying permanent tensions that exist, devising potential solutions to these tensions 
and associated problems, and generating a set of lessons and guidelines for achieving 
future success. Particular attention was placed on formation of policy at the COCOM 
level and below. Some of the discussions on the third day delved into interagency 
alignment and shortcomings of strategic vision. The working groups were asked to 
shape their discussions towards reviewing the roles and responsibilities debate as 
referenced in terms of the security-development nexus. 
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In the aftermath of the workshop, participants have been revising their papers to be 
published as an edited volume (please send inquiries to Jessica Piombo). This report is 
meant to capture the spirit of the presentations and related discussion, and to serve as 
a briefing document to U.S. government and other audiences interested in the 
proceedings.  
 





When the United States Command for Africa was created in February 2007, security was 
broadly conceived. AFRICOM trumpeted that it would be a new kind of combatant 
command, one that took a “whole of government” approach to Africa. The organization 
would engage in a wide range of activities that extended far beyond the narrow 
confines of national security, and it would attempt to take an extremely proactive 
stance in responding to and working with African concerns. To AFRICOM, security 
included not just the traditional concepts of state-centric national security conceived of 
in military terms (arms rivalries, strategic alliances, defense and military training), but 
also dimensions of human security: individual security and human rights, economic 
prosperity, societal reconstruction and stabilization, regional organization development, 
and capacity building for states and their institutions.  
 
In recognition of these factors, the United States Department of Defense established 
AFRICOM with a mandate that prioritized the soft side of security. As the mission and 
operating concept of AFRICOM took shape, its scope of activities began to include 
programs devoted to capacity building, humanitarian and civic assistance, natural 
disaster response, and “stabilization” activities that encompassed a significant 
component of infrastructure projects and economic development-style programs. 
AFRICOM would seek to build African capacity for non-kinetic and limited military 
missions, emphasizing humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, medical assistance, 
security cooperation, and capacity building. The command would be primarily oriented 
toward theater security cooperation and be capable of only limited military operations, 
requiring external support for large missions.  
 
AFRICOM’s creation quickly ignited a fierce public debate that was controversial and 
polarizing. The activist and non-governmental organization (NGO) communities 
immediately proclaimed that AFRICOM would militarize U.S. foreign policy in Africa, 
eclipsing development and governance efforts from the NGO communities, State 
Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  These 
concerns had some basis: U.S. military programs in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel 
included significant developmental aspects alongside more traditional projects and 
activities such as military training. In both of these areas, the U.S. military has been 
engaging in what it calls “humanitarian and civic assistance” (HCA).  
 
The outsider, HCA projects seem to be developmentally focused: they build or refurbish 
water wells, schools and health clinics; provide medical, dental and veterinary services; 
all with the goal of strengthening local societies. These projects can be included in a 
counter-insurgency strategy or be used to help stabilize an area and reduce insecurity. 
HCA has long been part of the toolkit of the Civil Affairs community of the U.S. Army; 
but since the end of the Vietnam era, the Civil Affairs community had been increasingly 
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sidelined and diminished in size. Yet with the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, this all 
changed. With a new project of “nation building,” the U.S. military began engaging in 
civil affairs-type projects on a grand scale, alongside major combat operations. The 
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs, in both Afghanistan and Iraq) were the most 
formal manifestation of these efforts, but in reality U.S. military forces had been 
informally conducting governance and economic rehabilitation projects as part of their 
daily duties for some time before the creation of the first PRT.  
 
AFRICOM’s creation was received with this experience in the backdrop, though this time 
the military role was unprecedented: the United States has never taken an active, 
sustained military posture within the African continent. To the development and 
humanitarian assistance communities that had been the forefront of U.S. engagement 
in Africa, the military’s new role seemed to alarmingly blur the boundaries between 
defense and development.  
 
The issues at the heart of the critique of U.S. Africa Command's creation, many of which 
were taken up in the workshop, had all been raised well before the announcement of 
the new command. The U.S. military's leading role in the reconstruction of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, along with its expanding role in disaster response had raised alarms in 
many quarters about the "proper" lead for "nation building" and related efforts. In 
Africa, these debates had been spurred by the operations of the Combined Joint Task 
Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the Trans Sahel Counter Terrorism Partnership, the 
Africa Partnership Station, and similar programs that had been operating throughout 
the first decade of the 21st century.  These programs all have attempted to reduce 
insecurity in Africa by combining traditional theater security cooperation and military-
focused training with more developmentally oriented programs that provide 
“humanitarian assistance” to vulnerable communities.1 
                                                      
1 To the U.S. military, "humanitarian assistance" refers to a set of five distinct programs. Only one of these 
is the same type of "humanitarian assistance" as the phrase is understood by the nongovernmental 
community: disaster response. The U.S. military runs programs under the HA rubric that include (1) 
Humanitarian Demining Assistance; (2) Humanitarian Assistance -  Excess Property Program (HA EP); (3) 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA); (4) Humanitarian Assistance Other (HAO); and (5) Overseas 
Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) programs. OHDACA projects are funded directly 
through regional combatant commanders to enable them to respond to disasters and promote post-
conflict reconstruction through "unobtrusive, low-cost, but highly efficacious” projects (Christopher 
Griffin, "A Working Plan," Armed Forces Journal, issue 4, 2007. Access at:  
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/04/2587549, verified June 24, 2011). The other HA programs 
are administered and overseen by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), and information 
about them can be accessed at http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm (verified on June 24, 2011). 
Within its first year, AFRICOM developed an internal document describing these programs, their statutory 
authorities and funding cycles, and instructing how each should be utilized within the command's area of 
responsibility, “FY08 – Humanitarian Assistance Program Standard Operating Procedures,” which is 
accessible through https://www.ohasis.org.  There are also two U.S. government/DoD programs designed 
for natural disaster response – the Foreign Humanitarian Disaster Response program and the 
Commanders Emergency Relief Funds (CERP). Government and economic reconstruction efforts are 
funded separately; these are the 1206, 1207 and 1210 programs that fund the provincial reconstruction 




Development and Security: What actors, roles and projects will achieve desired end-
states? 
 
One of the primary difficulties for the U.S. military in responding to these criticisms is 
that in regions like Africa any efforts to reduce insecurity will fail without addressing 
fundamental issues such as poverty, inequality, corruption and poor governance. 
Therefore, important questions arise about the respective roles of military, non-military 
governmental and non-governmental actors in these endeavors. Where does 
“development” end and “security and stabilization” begin?  The debate over these 
issues raged throughout 2007 and early 2008, as many interested parties took sides on 
whether AFRICOM would do more harm than good as it began to assume responsibility 
for U.S. military and security engagement with Africa. Multiple conferences were held at 
the time, but by necessity they were all speculative, as AFRICOM had not yet begun 
operations.  
 
Just as humanitarian assistance has come under fire in the past few years for 
inadvertently enabling the spread of war, the military’s non-kinetic, development-based 
approach has been widely criticized by development experts, the NGO community, and 
observers wary of militarizing U.S. foreign policy in Africa. The questions feed into a 
meta-debate about whether the choice is development OR security, or whether U.S. 
foreign policy seeks to create development FOR security.  
 
In an environment where most security problems are complex security issues – involving 
both natural and man-made causes – development and security are deeply intertwined. 
In this scenario, what is the role of the U.S. military in Africa and what are suitable 
military approaches to African security? Defining the roles and responsibilities of various 
actors – U.S. military, U.S. government non-military, international organizations, non-
governmental organizations – becomes part and parcel of defining the challenge of 
finding sustainable and long-term solutions to the political and regional instabilities that 
plague Africa and prevent the continent from truly realizing its full potential for 
economic and political development.  
                                                                                                                                                              
teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. Each of these programs has distinct goals, requirements and funding 
streams. 




Opening Remarks by Jessica Piombo, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School 
December 1, 2010 
 
We are here to focus in depth on a set of issues revolving around the intersection of 
development and security in Africa, and the operation, goals and effects of U.S. 
government programs that function in that mixed space. The issues we will focus on 
cover the nature of security and insecurity in Africa, the relationship between 
human/individual and state security, how development and security relate to one 
another, interagency coordination within the USG, and interactions between the U.S. 
government and nongovernmental actors.   
 
One of the primary difficulties for the U.S. military in thinking about how to engage with 
African countries is that in a place like the continent of Africa, any efforts to reduce 
insecurity will fail without addressing fundamental issues such as poverty, inequality, 
corruption and poor governance. Yet addressing these issues are not traditional roles of 
the military, and many debate whether an expanded military role should include 
activities in these realms. Therefore, important questions arise about the respective 
roles of military, non-military governmental and non-governmental actors in addressing 
insecurity in Africa.  
 
Where does “development” end and “security and stabilization” begin?  U.S. Africa 
Command’s creation in 2007 spurred a raging debate over these issues, as many 
interested parties took sides on whether AFRICOM would do more harm than good as it 
began to assume responsibility for U.S. military and security engagement with Africa. 
Multiple conferences were held at the time, but by necessity they were all speculative, 
as AFRICOM had not yet begun operations.  
 
Just as humanitarian assistance has come under fire in the past for inadvertently 
enabling the spread of war, the military’s non-kinetic, development-based approach has 
been widely criticized by development experts, the NGO community, and observers 
wary of militarizing U.S. foreign policy in Africa. The questions feed into a meta-debate 
about whether the choice is development OR security, or whether U.S. foreign policy 
seeks to create development FOR security.  
 
In an environment where most security problems are complex security issues – involving 
both natural and man-made causes – development and security are deeply intertwined. 
Responding to these issues necessitates a developmental and capacity building 
approach. 
 
All of these dynamics have led to a set of programs designed to reduce insecurity by 
involving multiple U.S. and non-governmental actors in a policy approach that provides 
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• Humanitarian and/or civic assistance; 
• Capacity building – governmental, military, economic; 
• Security sector reform – not just military, but the institutions of the rule of law as 
well; 
• Medical assistance and training; 
• Maritime security strengthening; and 
• Peacekeeping training. 
 
Some of these have involved the U.S. military in programs that others would consider to 
be more properly within the realm of development – support for education and 
healthcare, for example. In these programs, military personnel build or refurbish schools 
and medical buildings, build municipal trash systems, and provide basic medical and 
veterinary support. This is just a sample of the types of activities in which military teams 
engage, but is enough to show that clearly these are not within the scope of traditional 
military missions. Critics accuse the military of engaging in development through these 
projects, though most development experts would hesitate to label them genuine 
developmental efforts.  
 
These debates lead to a series of discussions about what is (and/or should be) the role 
of the U.S. military in Africa and what are suitable military approaches to African 
security? How does the military effectively work within a genuinely integrated, whole of 
government approach? How does it work in an integrated, multiple-government, 
multiple-agency, governmental and non-governmental approach? 
 
Defining the roles and responsibilities of various actors – U.S. military, U.S. government 
non-military, international organizations, non-governmental organizations – becomes 
part and parcel of defining the challenge of finding sustainable and long-term solutions 
to the political and regional instabilities that plague Africa and prevent the continent 
from truly realizing its full potential for economic and political development.   
Our challenge here, in this workshop, is to look at the broad scope of these issues but 
then to narrow in on assessments of actual programs that have been enacted – the 
CJTF-HOA, security sector reform and capacity building, humanitarian and civic 
assistance programs. The U.S. government, U.S. military and AFRICOM have been at this 
for a sufficient time to start reflecting on the outcomes that have been achieved, the 
challenges faced, and the continuing challenges that need to be overcome – or if they 
cannot – recognized and managed.  
 
Ultimately, we want to focus on the issue of the different actors involved in programs 
that aim to reduce insecurity in Africa. 
 
• Who are the main agents in these programs? 
• What are their various tasks and responsibilities? 
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• How do the different agencies interact with one another? Not just how well, but 
how in general and in specific types of activities?  
• What issues and debates arise from the involvement of military actors in 
missions that seem to be developmental in nature or orientation? 
• This gets to the roles and responsibilities aspect of our workshop.  
 
You all here have written papers that speak to almost all of these different issues. We 
arranged the workshop schedule in a way that attempted to bring out the various issues 
and dimensions and to stimulate discussion. That is the spirit of this workshop – to 
discuss these issues, facilitated by the work you all have done and the presentations you 
will give.  
Section Two: Panel One 
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PANEL ONE:  CONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY IN AFRICA 
 
Panel One was designed to present and develop different concepts of security in Africa. 
Panelists discussed the nature of traditional and human security, and ways of thinking 
about how power is exercised in various states of peace and conflict. Terrence Lyons, a 
professor at George Mason University in Washington DC, argued that the question of 
security in Africa is essentially a political one. There are distinct forms of governance 
that underlie systems of rule, whether those are peaceful or violent forms of 
governance. A critical element in managing conflict is ensuring governance has rules and 
institutions that are strong and legitimate, and which reinforce peace rather than 
incentivize violence. Lyons argued that a prevalent form of conflict in Africa—civil 
wars—do not represent the presence of anarchy, but represent systems of governance 
based on fear and predation that reward violence versus cooperation.   
 
A genuine understanding of the political underpinnings of both conflict and peace is an 
important, often overlooked, dynamic in analyses of security and insecurity. It is the 
nature of governance that links individuals and states in both peace and conflict, and 
particularly, in the transitions between peace and conflict. David Walter Dongo 
presented an overview of the notion of traditional versus human security, and argued 
that notions of human security and traditional security need to be addressed as 
separate but equally weighted concepts to improve conditions. The changing global 
paradigm since the end of WWII has shown a more limited role for traditional security 
approaches in Africa and has forced a shifting emphasis towards human security.  
Illustrated in reports such as the 1994 United Nations Development Program’s Human 
Development Report, human security has forced a widening of the security paradigm to 
include threats to economies, food, health, environment, individuals and communities. 
Dongo suggested that a change is needed from a top-down focus on security to a 
bottom-up engagement that will better incorporate the objectives of human security. 
 
This panel served as an important introduction to subsequent panels allowing 
participants the ability to address underlying assumptions of what is meant by security, 
who is the securitized actor, and whose security is being provided for? 
 
Participants and Objectives  
In this panel Terrence Lyons, George Mason University, presented research on how 
distinct systems of governance are associated with particular phases of conflict in Africa. 
David Walter Dongo, Afrikan Community Empowerment Program, presented on the 
relationship between traditional and human notions of security. Laura Perazzola 
moderated the panel. 
 
Panel Narrative 
Lyons argued that governance is a key element in conflict mitigation. Like regimes on 
the international scale, governance has norms and patterns of behavior that generate 
Section Two: Panel One 
 11 
specific political opportunity structures and hence reward specific political and military 
strategies. Governance that effectively manages conflict and prevents wide-scale 
violence depends upon well-understood and widely accepted rules of interaction and a 
set of norms and institutions that reinforce these rules. These rules and norms are 
embedded in society and develop path dependent patterns of repression and violence. 
A critical element in managing conflict is ensuring governance has rules and institutions 
that are strong and legitimate. Lyons argued that civil wars do not represent the 
presence of anarchy; but rather alternative systems of governance based on fear and 
predation that reward violence versus cooperation.  Governance does not require 
government per se, as evidenced in Somalia where an informal array of business groups, 
traditional authorities, and civic groups converge to provide governance.  Governments 
that have the capacity to juggle the contradictory pressures and ordeals of prolonged 
conflict learn flexibility and resilience and adapt to the imperatives of wartime 
governance. Understanding that there is a logic to conflict in which new norms and 
institutions develop that perpetuate violence, is critical to finding pathways from peace 
to conflict and back again.  
 
Dongo argued there are diverging views of traditional and human security, but that both 
present forms of vulnerability for communities in Africa. Traditional security focuses on 
state capability in protecting state interests and perceived internal and external threats 
to those interests. Traditional security during the Cold War was based upon balance of 
power demands between U.S. and Soviet interests.  This brought relative stability and 
coherence to the security paradigm in Africa as states could align with great powers and 
receive economic, military, and political benefits in kind.  However, as the Cold War 
ended and balance of power politics receded, African regimes lost external support and 
the capability to manage internal conflict due to environmental, socioeconomic, or 
structural problems. The changing global paradigm displayed weaknesses with 
traditional security approaches in Africa and forced a shifting emphasis towards human 
security. Joining the international lexicon through the seminal 1994 United Nations 
Development Program’s Human Development Report, the concept of human security 
broadened the scope of security to include threats on economies, food, health, 
environment, individuals and communities. Dongo suggested that a change is needed 
from a top-down focus on security to a bottom-up engagement that will better 
incorporate the objectives of human security.  
 
The discussion period opened with an anecdote about the establishment of an Office of 
Food Security within USAID and how, conceptually, this move was ultimately a crossing 
of traditional streams of responsibility, accountability, and funding.  This led to a short 
recap of the 3-D approach to foreign policy (defense, development, & diplomacy) and a 
quip: “as long as the other organization takes care of the other two ‘d’-s we’ll take care 
of ours.”  While slightly facetious, this sheds light on a thread that ran throughout other 
discussions as well: the interagency is challenged by overlapping respective roles in the 
mission set and capability to access resources of the other.  
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One question from the floor addressed Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  
Lyons argued that while all peace agreements are imperfect documents, they often are 
the best that can be done under the pressures that exist at the time they are negotiated.  
Lyons noted that in Sudan, the international community did not seem to display the 
commitment to enforce a peace externally, and that it fell to the Northern and Southern 
Sudanese to “get the politics right” and be less reliant on long term United Nations, 
African Union, or AFRICOM support.  He highlighted that AFRICOM’s role should remain 
foremost in support of political engagement. 
 
Dongo suggested that AFRICOM’s involvement, as a military command, was definitely 
not the answer.  In a situation like Sudan, he suggested that uniformed military 
involvement brings with it very serious pre-conceived notions which unnecessarily 
undermine human security.  He cited the example of human rights abuses by Ugandan 
military personnel in Northern Uganda, which rendered any involvement of uniformed 
personnel as illegitimate to local populations. In this case, military support to diplomatic 
initiatives or peace processes has the potential to undermine the security process. 
 
While the line of questioning was abbreviated by the time limit on the panel, the 
conversation opened into a discussion of how the militaries should partner with NGOs 
and non-military organizations to assist in accomplishing the diplomacy and 
development aspects of the 3-D approach; the areas the military is not specifically best 
trained for and experienced with. This emphasized a re-occurring theme of the panel 
that focused on the perception of boundaries. Boundaries exist between urban and 
rural, elite and communal as well as between and within agencies operating in conflict 
zones.  While some solutions were explored, such as military (host-nation and U.S.) 
working with NGOs, it was clear that a deeper understanding of the respective players’ 
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PANEL TWO:  INTERSECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY I - 
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
 
This panel addressed the roots of security and insecurity in Africa by examining two 
relationships: how stability enhances development, and how one particular security 
threat, transnational organized crime, undermines development. In Joseph Siegle’s 
presentation, Siegle asked how a legitimate, effective, and accountable state can be 
built so that it can deliver security and social services to its citizens and, thereby, 
maintain stability over time? He argued that there is already considerable experience 
that international actors can utilize to guide the development aspects of stabilization 
efforts, but what is lacking are African security forces that are familiar with and capable 
of implementing a disciplined counter-insurgency campaign. In addition, more adequate 
African and international institutions are needed to facilitate the integration of various 
stabilization efforts. Siegle concluded that focus should be placed on utilizing existing 
capabilities in USG agencies to train, resource, and enhance African stabilization efforts. 
 
Davin O’Regan's presentation narrowed the discussion to a particular non-traditional 
threat by asking how to identify and manage transnational crime on the security-
development spectrum. Given the extent of weak governance in much of Africa, 
transnational crime can easily be facilitated through corruption without recourse to 
violence. Transnational crime has penetrated many formal business, legal, security, and 
governance institutions in Africa, thus making the problem one which requires a robust 
response. A primary recommendation is that the international community should focus 
on enhancing the quality of governance within transnational organized crime host and 
transit countries through advisor assistance, training, and stronger relationships. 
 
 
Participants and Objectives 
In this panel Joseph Siegle, Director of Research at the Africa Center for Strategic 
Studies, presented his work on stabilizing development initiatives and processes. Davin 
O’Regan, also from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, presented on how to pinpoint 
and deal with transnational crime on the security-development spectrum. Jason Neal 
moderated the panel. 
 
Panel Narrative  
This panel addressed the issue of the roots of security and insecurity in Africa by 
examining two relationships: how stability enhances development, and how one 
particular security threat, transnational organized crime, undermines development.   
 
Siegle argued that a critical question to consider is how a legitimate, effective, and 
accountable state can be built so that it delivers security and social services to its 
citizens and, thereby, maintains stability over time? Siegle analyzed how stability 
facilitates development processes. While poverty is a key factor of instability, there are 
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still relatively poor but peaceful nations in Africa, such as Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, and 
Senegal. Thus, there is clearly more at stake in understanding why some but not all poor 
nations are prone to conflict.  The interaction of governance and economics is one 
factor.  Nations governed by autocratic leaders and characterized by low-income 
economies are several times more likely to become failed states. Siegle argued that the 
absence of a political outlet through which citizens can change their leaders has the 
effect of rationalizing violence as an alternative to autocratic governance.  In addition, 
as the probability of conflict increases, per capita income decreases introducing a 
feedback mechanism.  
 
Another aspect of many contemporary security challenges in Africa is that they tend to 
be geographically localized rather than national in scope; for example, the eastern DRC, 
northern Nigeria, and the Niger Delta all represent specific regions of geographic 
insecurity.  There are often distinguishable features of these regions that put them at 
risk, such as ethnic cleavages, environmental issues, or resource abundance.  States in 
Africa also have historical institutional barriers that contribute to these fundamental 
issues of instability, such as the fragility and dysfunction of state creation as initiated 
during the colonial era. 
 
The multi-dimensional nature of state fragility demands the strengthening of integrated 
national and international stabilization strategies – bringing together political, 
development, and security actors – both official and non-governmental.  He suggests 
there is already considerable experience that international actors can utilize to guide 
the development aspects of these stabilization efforts. What is most lacking for the 
implementation of effective stabilization strategies at this time are (1) the familiarity 
with and capacity on the part of African security sectors to implement a disciplined 
counter-insurgency campaign – and (2) adequate regional and international 
mechanisms to facilitate the integration of the various complementary components of 
these stabilization efforts. Accordingly, a reassessment of roles to be played to address 
the development aspects of the stability equation is unwarranted. Rather, greater focus 
should be given to understanding how to better integrate the roles, functional expertise, 
and experience that currently exists within the USG inter-agency to meet the respective 
multi-dimensional aspects of the stabilization challenge.  
 
The second presenter Davin O’Regan, focused on the security and development 
challenges involved with Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). O’Regan delineated the 
nature of transnational organized crime in Africa, explaining its security and 
development dimensions on the continent, and how it manifests itself within different 
contexts. TOC is a compound threat with both security and development dimensions, 
requiring coordinated and complementary reforms and assistance in order to have more 
sustainable, positive, and sizable impacts. 
 
Transnational organized crime includes illicit trafficking in arms, narcotics, people, 
counterfeit goods, and many licit goods and commodities but in ways that circumvent 
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taxes, customs, and various other regulations.  Additionally, money laundering, 
extortion, financial fraud, producing counterfeit or illegally obtaining official documents, 
cyber crime, kidnapping, and other types of crimes not associated with illicit trafficking 
also often qualify.  Such crime is “organized” in the sense that it typically is recurring and 
includes multiple perpetrators often performing specialized functions and tasks.  
Organized crime is “transnational” when goods cross borders, perpetrators are in more 
than one country, or its proceeds move between financial systems.   
 
Given the extent of weak governance in much of Africa, transnational crime can be 
facilitated through corruption without recourse to violence. Indications of connections 
between high-level political figures in Ghana, Mozambique, Kenya, and South Africa 
suggest that traffickers and transnational criminals may have substantially penetrated 
politics and law making in many African countries. Clearly, transnational organized crime 
in Africa requires a robust response, yet such responses are complicated and sensitive 
given TOC’s security and development implications.   
 
Though counter-TOC strategies and policies will vary, a critical feature of all efforts 
should be to enhance the quality of governance within TOC host and transit countries. 
One way to address TOC could be through a hybrid of the international community and 
national governments.  The international community can bring in specialists to partner 
with lawyers, judges, and investigators, empowering workers on the ground and fragile 
institutions towards developing counter corruption programs. Depending on the scale 
and type of TOC prevalent in a given context, available entry points and priority 
institutions to support and assist will vary.  Comprehensive counter-TOC strategies may 
often have to commence an intervention indirectly whether due to a lack of political will 
or available counterparts in the state apparatus. Ultimately, the most sustainable 
solution to address TOC in Africa will be more reliable, responsive, and legitimate 
institutions. 
 
The discussion period focused on the relevance of economic makers as drivers of 
stability. The audience was curious why the presentations were so heavily focused on 
economics. The presenters suggested that economics are essential to security because it 
produces jobs and revenue.  In addition, normal economic activity has a stabilizing 
influence on communities and serves as a facilitator of human security.  
 
The next portion of the discussion concerned assisting governments that lack the 
capacity to handle TOC problems. A hybrid special court, such as the one used in Sierra 
Leone, was suggested as an ideal way for the international community to address TOC. 
However, special courts and various international interventions are only designed to 
step in when the problems become too large for national governments to handle. The 
assisted government must set up the agreement with the UN.  However, it was 
suggested that a focus on countering TOC could be used as a starting point or model for 
other external assistance situations. 
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PANEL THREE: INTERSECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY PART II - 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
 
The third panel offered three perspectives on how security and development are linked 
and how this linkage has developed the establishment and activities of AFRICOM.  
Clarence Bouchat discussed at least three options the U.S. military could use to move 
beyond its traditional security role and effectively apply soft power to help stabilize and 
develop Africa.  The first option is for the military to concentrate on its current specialty, 
that is, focusing on a limited role in providing military—to—military assistance in the 
realms of security cooperation and host nation military assistance. The second option is 
for the U.S. military to lead the interagency effort in humanitarian and civil assistance as 
it has done in the past, but only in non-permissive environments where civilian actors 
have limited capability to operate with effect. The third option is for the military to 
engage in Nation Assistance or nation building such as security sector reform in which 
the military helps builds capacity in the host nation’s security forces. 
 
Jan Bachmann’s presentation analyzed the establishment and early evolution of U.S. 
Africa Command as representing a transformation in thinking regarding security and 
development. The post-Cold War realization that serious threats can emerge from 
ungoverned spaces in weak states solidified the connection between security and 
development into what Bachmann referred to as the security development nexus.  
AFRICOM’s initial emphasis on interagency efforts and development projects reflected 
these shifts in approach.  
 
In the third presentation, Andrea Talentino positioned AFRICOM’s establishment within 
a broader trend that has also included changes in multilateral organizations like the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS).  Within this trajectory, she identified several weaknesses in 
AFRICOM’s approach to development. In her assessment, AFRICOM was pursuing a form 
of development that fulfilled certain formulaic markers of democracy, rather than 
building a system of government that creates effective states with active citizens who 
believe in democracy. Without long-term efforts to create mechanisms that connect 
citizens to government, efforts can ignore, marginalize, and neglect local actors and 
resources, and in the end contradict what the local population actually needs.  Talentino 
argued that U.S. government policy is not coherent enough to allow AFRICOM to forge a 
comprehensive effort. She recommended that the U.S. government be more selective 
about which countries it partners with to ensure that they have the will and the capacity 
to make use of U.S. assistance.  
 
Participants and Objectives 
In this panel Clarence Bouchat, U.S. Army War College, presented research on the U.S. 
Military’s interagency role in African development. Jan Bachman, University of 
Goteborg, Sweden, presented on the military’s role in security and development 
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missions with AFRICOM. Andrea Talentino, Drew University, presented on the future of 
AFRICOM in development activities. Jason Neal moderated the panel. 
 
Panel Narrative  
The first presenter, Clarence Bouchat, presented his paper titled: “The U.S. Military’s 
Interagency Role in African Development: Lead, Support, or More of the Same?” In this 
paper and through his presentation, Bouchat argued that stability is dependent upon 
the mutually constitutive elements of security, governance, and development, however, 
each of these dimensions are best addressed by different actors. For example, the 
military is good at providing security and stability, but less so at promoting sustainable 
economic development or building systems of governance.  While the military excels in 
providing hard power, it accepts soft power missions as sometimes necessary; yet other 
actors must be involved to provide true progress in the areas of governance and 
development. Ultimately, the keys to security and stability in Africa are effective 
governance and a strong economy.   
 
Bouchat reviewed four options for the military as it pursues interagency approaches to 
promoting security in Africa.  The first is to continue traditional military activities in the 
realm of Theater Security Cooperation.  Security Assistance aims to leverage military to 
military contacts to professionalize partner nation militaries; this is especially useful in 
Africa, where militaries tend to need this type of assistance due to the tendency for 
regime preservation or overthrow.  Methods to achieving security assistance include 
IMET (International Military Education and Training) provides education opportunities 
for individual officers, while the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 
(ACOTA) program helps to upgrade the peacekeeping capabilities of African militaries by 
providing training light infantry and small unit tactics. 
 
The second option for the military to fill its interagency role is to use Humanitarian and 
Civil Assistance, which is part of a combatant commander’s grand strategy of how to 
stabilize communities.  This type of assistance is more along the lines of development, 
but since the military is limited by deployment schedules and short-term results as 
opposed to long-term maintenance and sustainment, logistical and qualitative problems 
arise. 
 
The third approach the military can assume is to undertake Nation Assistance or nation 
building.  According to Bouchat, Nation Assistance is as close to development as the 
DoD gets.  A typical form of this type of assistance is Security Sector Reform, in which 
the DoD engages in a comprehensive effort to help develop and train a country’s 
security sector. Activities include training and equipping security forces, assisting with 
security force doctrine, and institution building.  
 
The last option is for the U.S. military to support another agency’s lead.  In this scenario, 
the military would provide funding, people and assets in support of programs initiated 
and led by other U.S. government agencies.  Bouchat argued that USAID is the obvious 
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choice to be the lead implementing agency in a developmental approach to security, 
since USAID has long-term expertise in development that is internationally accepted.  If 
USAID plans and directs the interagency effort, it would still require many of the 
organizational changes proposed under the military lead option.  In addition, USAID 
would need to become a more robust organization, with improved planning abilities, 
training, and resource capabilities.  
     
Bachmann  presented a think piece that took a broader perspective on the role of 
AFRICOM in development and security. In “Laboratory AFRICOM: The Military’s Role in 
Security/Development Missions,” Bachman recalls the controversial narrative in 2007 
and 2008 when AFRICOM was created. He argued that despite the debate and 
appearance of being a “new” kind of command, AFRICOM nevertheless constituted an 
institution that was a Cold War relic with more interest in resource and terrorism issues 
than African partners.  Many critics were not convinced by the way that AFRICOM’s 
creators attempted to package and sell the organization, and felt the new rhetoric just 
obscured the true intent of the command.  Also, there were fears from the Department 
of State and USAID regarding the emphasis on the new approach with a heavy civilian 
command.  In response, AFRICOM stepped back from the lofty rhetoric, de-emphasized 
the new elements of the command and focused mainly on its traditional role (military to 
military activities).   
  
Bachmann observed that since 2010, debates about AFRICOM had become increasingly 
depoliticized and restricted, no longer presenting the command as an opportunity to 
expand the mandate of the military and AFRICOM’s place in that mandate.  This, 
Bachmann argued, had the effect of blurring the line between civilian and military 
activities.  According to General Kip Ward, AFRICOM’s first commander, the discussion 
shifted from “why to implement AFRICOM?” to “why AFRICOM is the result of the post-
Cold War transformation of security and development?”, reflecting new thinking from 
Europe, the UK, and Scandinavian countries that has created new responses, widened 
the understanding of security and development, and integrated civilian and military 
activities. A broadened role of the military is required for human security and 
development challenges where capacity building focuses on population protection, 
stabilization, and conflict prevention.  
  
Security and stabilization are required due to the changing nature of the threat, 
characterized by global uncertainty and transnational conflict.  This situation led to 
increasing attention on fragile states after the Cold War and ungoverned spaces after 
9/11, which widened military activities into the development domain.  Bachmann 
argued that the security-development nexus is undisputed wisdom since its vagueness, 
bridging character, and progressive and normative notions made it popular without 
challenging the traditional ideas of state security.  However, the nexus entails increased 
responsibility and a moral obligation of the West to cover conflict prevention, counter-
insurgency, reconstruction and state building, necessitating a whole of government or 
comprehensive approach.  
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Ultimately, Bachmann argued that AFRICOM embodied the predicaments of widening 
security and development and mobilized several boundary-crossing concepts, including 
a focus on the strengthening of state capacity.  AFRICOM was the result of this wider 
debate and has made use of innovations as described in the counter-insurgency manual 
and put these ideas into practice.  This includes ideas of active and sustained security 
and emphasis on interagency partnership.  AFRICOM also inspired new thinking and 
discussions, particularly about how military geographic combatant commands should be 
structured in the future.  
 
The third presenter, Talentino, began by stressing the importance of context, pointing 
out that security and development have been linked in academic literature for a long 
time.  In “Making the Difference Real: AFRICOM and the Future of the Development 
Command, ” she argued that the nineteenth century European powers in Africa had a 
different definition of development, one that focused on state security needs.  Only in 
the last decade, has the UN shifted from focusing on macro indicators of development 
(state-level factors) to more micro-level factors, such as the impact of development on 
individuals and communities. The securitization of development was always there, she 
argued, and was not created by U.S. involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, or AFRICOM.   
 
Talentino argued that the true shift that has occurred is the developmentization of 
security, rather than the securitization of development.  Several changes over the last 
two decades exemplify this trend. She highlighted the fact that regional organizations 
such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and ECOWAS (Economic Community 
of West African States) have recently incorporated references to and objectives defined 
around stability and development in their charters, arguing that development progress 
is necessary to ensure stable, conflict-free futures. We also see elements of this in the 
U.S. Army, as demonstrated by their most recent field manual, which added 
development explicitly as an Army activity.  
  
When considering AFRICOM in particular, one key point is the concept of difference: it 
explicitly assumed a variety of development aspects.  Talentino argued that after one 
takes into account the developmentalization of security, AFRICOM ultimately was not 
truly very different from a “traditional” combatant command. In her view, AFRICOM fit a 
trend that had been building in recent years, and was less radical than its original critics 
argued. AFRICOM was supposed to reflect a focus on capacity building rather than 
fighting, operationalizing the idea that focus should be on shoring up African states, 
facilitating abilities, and helping them help themselves. 2  AFRICOM was also supposed 
                                                      
2 This posture changed after General Carter Ham assumed Command of AFRICOM in February 2011. In his 
first year at the command, General Ham de-emphasized development and capacity building, and instead 
focused the command on preparation to undertake kinetic operations (such as the Libya intervention) and 
more traditional theater security assistance.  
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to bring coherence to activities in Africa, gathering it all under one roof and attempting 
to integrate them.   
  
If AFRICOM truly hoped to promote development for security, Talentino argued, it 
needed to look at the development that Africa needs.  The concept of development is 
densely packed and involves a complex set of issues, yet the U.S. military often focused 
more on the trappings of the liberal democratic peace as promoting development. The 
goal is not only to bolster effective interactions but also to create mechanisms for 
citizens to be connected to them.  The default has been to focus on markers and 
indicators rather than on building needed capabilities and thinking about how to 
establish capacity building programs.  This emphasis on markers also neglects citizens as 
a resource.  One of the problems of international efforts is that the international 
community has often ignored, marginalized or neglected local actors or saw them as the 
problem and at times contradicted what the local population wanted.   
 
Talentino also argued that development required giving attention to social development, 
something rarely attempted in international programs by development agencies, let 
alone military actors. Lasting development must merge social programs with a 
comprehensive effort that creates the means of inclusion and provides access to the 
levers of power.  This includes not only engagement, but also protection, which is crucial.  
People have to be secure to be engaged.  This, finally, nuances the notion of what 
“security” is – individual rights, freedoms and capacities – rather than just state-centril 
notions. Security is both physical and broader than what is traditionally thought.     
 
Talentino’s final point was that it is important for U.S. policy to be selective about who 
the country works with.  A partner state needs to at least have the will to enact 
programs. As examples, she noted that training Liberian and Ghanaian military makes 
sense, while training the DRC military does not make as much sense, both because of 
the interest of the governments and the broader environment in each of these countries. 
In the DRC, the United States can train the military and have short-term success, but 
when the soldiers return to their units and don’t get paid, they will lose their training.  
The Liberian and Ghanaian governments are more supportive of the integrity of their 
militaries, and help their military personnel to internalize internationally-provided 
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PANEL FOUR: THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMUNITY 
 
This panel focused on the role of Military Civil Affairs in reducing insecurity in Africa.  
Master Sergeant Brian McCartney from U.S. Africa Command presented lessons learned 
from his experience with Civil Affairs units in the Sahel.  He argued that the expansion of 
the Civil Affairs mission has been perceived as an encroachment into what was once 
seen by many in the diplomatic and development communities as their exclusive roles. 
While questioned whether Civil Affairs is an appropriate role for the military, 
McCartney’s presentation was based on the assumption that there is value in the 
military conducting civil affairs outside of the war zone. Anna Simons, from the Naval 
Postgraduate School Department of Defense Analysis, focused on what the role of 
military Civil Affairs community is and whether it should be conducting civil operations 
in a non-kinetic environment.  She presented a case study of the Army Civil Affairs corps 
in the Philippines in 1954. Both presenters recognized limits of effectiveness based on 
mission scope and time constraints. 
 
While McCartney focused on weaknesses in current planning, training, and execution, 
particularly in how regular and reserve corps trains prior to their mission, Dr. Simons 
took a wider and more critical view of the prospects of any involvement of Civil Affairs 
units in developing countries. McCartney proposed that there should be two distinct 
types of Civil Affairs corps, one with a longer and more comprehensive mission set by 
AFRICOM and a separate reserve corps that is trained for a different, more limited, 
mission set. Simon’s suggested that the U. S. military should remove itself from capacity 
building altogether. Instead, military interaction should limit itself to efforts to 
professionalize foreign militaries and the promotion of foreign military sales programs. 




Participants and Objectives 
In this panel Brian McCartney, US Africa Command, presented on lessons learned as a 
Civil Affairs corps member in Africa. Anna Simons, Naval Postgraduate School, presented 
a case study on civil affairs operations in the Philippines in 1954. Both discussed the 
roles of Civil Affairs within the framework of security building in Africa. Laura Perazzola 
moderated the panel. 
 
Panel Narrative 
Brian McCartney argues that the expansion of the civil affairs mission has been 
perceived as an encroachment into what was seen by many in the diplomatic and 
development communities as their exclusive roles. While some people question 
whether Civil Affairs (CA) is an appropriate role for the military, McCartney’s 
presentation was based on the assumption that there is value in the military conducting 
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CA outside of the war zone. He suggests that this represents a necessary progression in 
DoD support towards foreign policy in order to meet US national security objectives.  
 
In 2010, the U.S. deployed Civil Affairs teams are in ten countries in Africa.. McCartney 
argued that CA teams can produce positive results in stabilization and development, but 
only when utilized as part of a comprehensive strategy. When used as stand-alone 
programs, not complemented by activities of other U.S. government or non-
governmental agencies, their impact is greatly diminished. He argued that CA teams are 
best utilized as expeditionary, initial entry tools in pursuit of national security objectives, 
which must then be followed by a larger development effort. Without the follow-on 
programs, the relationships that the CA teams have built are very likely to suffer.   
 
McCartney echoed a common complaint of the developmental and NGO community 
when he argued that there is a point of diminishing returns where small scale activities 
can do more harm than good if they have not led to a larger U.S. effort to develop a 
given area.  A comprehensive and productive approach therefore requires a unity of 
effort between the “three pillars”, not only in terms of executing activities, but also in 
terms of determining the long—term achievement of our national security strategy.  
That requires a great deal of closeness in interagency working relationships that U.S. 
actors have yet to achieve. While continual projects within the same region can build 
trust between local populations and the militaries (both domestic and international) 
over time, the Civil Affairs communities are ill suited, as currently deployed between 
active and reserve components, to make a lasting and strategic improvement. 
Additionally, they stand to do more harm than good if the gaps in coverage are not 
quickly identified and addressed. 
 
One of the biggest problems McCartney outlined was the complexity of interagency 
organizational structures.  Different departments have different risk tendencies, 
capabilities, time horizons, and rules and regulations. For example, while CA teams may 
desire to carry rifles for force protection, an Embassy official within DoS may only 
authorize concealable weapons in order to appear less aggressive to the host nation 
population. Yet the areas where CA teams desire to reach out to may be outside the 
protective range of DoS, thus necessitating greater force protection measures. Until 
embassies are able to accept high-risk engagement, CA teams cannot perform the types 
of missions they train for. 
 
Anna Simons presented a working paper on the benefit of taking a hands-off approach 
to development assistance arguing that in most instances, development assistance 
increases corruption in the recipient country, thus undermining state sovereignty.  
Citing the example of Edward Landsdale’s success in the Philippines elections (circa 
1954) as her reference case, she discussed the value of only offering assistance to 
countries that were capable of taking the initiative to improve their circumstances. 
Simons contended that the only beneficial role military could play in development is as 
trainers (to improve professionalization of foreign militaries) and to promote foreign 
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military sales, which would provide the United States with greater access to that nation. 
Civic Action needs to be a homegrown activity, perhaps supported by U.S., but it cannot 
be lead by an outside force. Because civil affairs was conceived as a component of a 
counterinsurgency strategy, it cannot be divorced from an overarching kinetic effort. 
Using civil affairs to create development will only perpetuate corruption and aid 
dependency, and is contrary to the true intent of CA. On her analysis, Simons 
recommended a comprehensive reduction in all military activities that attempt to 
pursue social, economic or other developmental goals outside of military capacity 
building.  
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PANEL FIVE: DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY IN EAST AFRICA 
 
This panel focused on security and development aspects relevant to East Africa. Jessica 
Piombo, from the Naval Post Graduate School, presented on the civil affairs activities of 
the Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). She outlined a number of 
anticipated and unanticipated effects of the ways that projects are carried out, and 
analyzed their likely impact both on development and security in the countries where 
these activities take place.  
 
Maureen Farrell and Jessica Lee presented the initial findings of a study designed to 
measure the baseline of Civil Affairs projects conducted by the CJTF-HOA in Kenya.  
Farrell and Lee found that the projects have improved perceptions of the United States 
where they are conducted, contrary to popular criticisms. Farrell and Lee also presented 
their research as a model of how qualitative assessments can help to demonstrate the 
strengths and weaknesses of U.S. military activities.  
 
Brendan Sullivan and Rebecca Mason, both working at the NGO Educate! (Uganda), 
presented a paper on the security environment from the perspective of a Non-
Governmental Organization operating in Uganda and focused on the effectiveness of 
Military-NGO liaison in Somalia and Uganda.  Traditional notions of security based upon 
upholding the rationale of state borders do not hold sway over transnational groups 
operating in postcolonial realities of the developing world, where “the nation-state has 
unnaturally superseded the national state.”  
 
In all presentations, the relationship between security and development is highlighted 
as being most effective when coordinated, repeated, and measured. The open 
discussion that followed the presentations focused on how the perception of the U.S. 
can be influenced by being culturally and historically aware of the conditions that 
predicated involvement of a coordinating authority (such as AFRICOM or the CJTF-HOA) 
to ensure consolidated effort. 
  
Participants and Objectives 
In this panel Jessica Piombo, Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
presented a teaching case study entitled, “Military Provision of Humanitarian and 
Civic Assistance: A Day in the Life of a Civil Affairs Team in the Horn of Africa.”3 Maureen 
Farrell and Jessica Lee, U.S. Africa Command, co-presented research undertaken for the 
Social Science Research Center through a Socio-Cultural Analysis Team (SCRAT). Their 
research focused on how human security projects affect local communities and advance 
U.S. government objectives. Rebecca Mason and Brendan Sullivan, co-presented on the 
relationship between poverty and conflict in Somalia and Uganda. Gustav Jordt 
moderated the panel. 
                                                      
3 National Defense University, Center for Complex Operations Case Study Number 5, May 2010. 




Piombo presented a case study of the U.S. military’s provision of humanitarian and civic 
assistance in the Horn of Africa based on field research in East Africa conducted in 2007 
and 2008, and follow-on interviews at AFRICOM in 2009 and 2010.  When the Marines 
established Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti in 2002, it 
was meant to be a short-term mission to capture terrorists.  In 2006, the U.S. Navy took 
over the mission and shifted the emphasis to reconstruction and stabilization in over 
nine countries in eastern Africa, while the primary mission remained counterterrorism.  
The CJTF-HOA sent Civil Affairs teams, typically comprised of five to eight people each, 
to conduct development projects that were quick impact, low-cost, which the teams 
could complete on the spot as well as longer-term special projects.  Blending the 
security and development orientation of the task force, the CA teams conducted these 
projects primarily in areas thought to be vulnerable to terrorism.  
 
Piombo illustrated the complexity of implementing successful development projects in 
CJTF-HOA.  There were a number of bureaucratic hurdles that the teams had to work 
through in order to see a project from start to finish. In order to circumvent the 
approvals process for official humanitarian assistance projects, she found that teams 
tended to instead focus their efforts on small projects that they could execute using the 
CJTF-HOA’s operating funds. These “minimal expenditure” were at that time  less 
constrained by bureaucratic hurdles, as the CA teams did not need to seek embassy or 
COCOM approval for them (this has changed since 2011). These projects were small, 
most of the time costing under $2500, and had to be quick impact, unplanned 
engagements. However, these types of low-end projects were not what Civil Affairs 
teams were meant to focus on. Instead, they were supposed to spend most of their time 
planning  projects that would have a higher-order strategic impact can better support 
the overall mission of CJTF-HOA.  The tension between focusing on minimal expenditure 
projects, which were quick impact and locally owned, versus the larger official HA 
projects, which were better coordinated with other USG agencies but took at least six 
months to complete, illustrated many of the complex tensions created in military 
engagements that spanned the development-security divide. . 
 
Farrell and Lee co-presented on civil military operations in the East and Horn of Africa 
and how the socio-cultural effects of these operations can contribute to the 
implementation of the U.S. government’s foreign policy in those regions.  Their study 
was based on field research in three areas of eastern Africa, the North Eastern and Rift 
Valley Provinces in Kenya, as well as Tanga in coastal Tanzania.  Echoing one of the 
workshop’s most occurring themes, they noted that their research revealed that the 
“whole of government approach” was often made difficult by synchronization problems 
that developed from differences within institutional cultures. These manifested in many 
ways, ranging from the simple use of language (e.g. “schedule” versus “battle rhythm”), 
to the application of complex problem solving strategies.  They reviewed additional 
tensions in the “3D” approach, noting that since Civil Affairs teams fall under the 
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authority of the Ambassador, the relationship between DoD and other agencies can be 
mutually reinforcing or quite tense.  Relationships tend to work best when the DoD is 
seen as the third (and least important) “D” in the 3D metric.  Farrell and Lee witnessed 
mutually-reinforcing relationships between Embassy Country Teams and MCAT in 
Tanzania, however in Kenya the relationship was less conducive to advancing U.S. policy.  
 
Finally, Farrell and Lee argued that the U.S. military should assess its programs through 
more than just quantitative methods that count inputs. They can also conduct 
qualitative assessments that enable fine-grained analysis of both the strengths and 
weaknesses of U.S. military activities, particularly focusing on outcomes. In some 
instances, the U.S. military did an excellent job coordinating with host nation 
counterparts, in other instances, the military came up short in fully communicating and 
coordinating efforts with partners. In addition, synergy among agencies will contribute 
to greater effectiveness.  Shortfalls in 3D coordination can lead to problems with 
strategic communication efforts, missed opportunities to synch with other USG 
programs, and failure to identify key identity groups to partner with.  Finally, the U.S. 
military has a distinct military purpose behind its human security projects that should be 
kept in mind. 
 
The third group of presenters, Mason and Sullivan, presented a paper that posited the 
centrality of human security as an essential component of protecting vulnerable 
populations in Africa subject to the dangers of transnational entities. Traditional notions 
of security based upon upholding the rationale of state borders do not hold sway over 
transnational groups operating in postcolonial realities of the developing world, where 
“the nation-state has unnaturally superseded the national state.”  The authors studied 
the cases of Somalia and Uganda, arguing that the US military should move away from a 
traditional security based policy, and instead concentrate on moving funds and focus to 
more direct government and non-government sponsored humanitarian assistance 
programs. The security and development climate in East Africa should be viewed as a 
regional issue, not a national issue based upon ineffective borders. The authors 
compared developmental failures in Somalia against successes in Uganda, and 
suggested that Uganda’s developmental success and relative move to peace over the 
past quarter-century can be best explained through the structural influence 
international organizations have had on policy and program development. Uganda and 
the international community have been successful with an aid-led reform agenda 
because of a significant investment in monitoring and evaluation, attention to structural 
reform, and an absence of conflict over these reforms due to a domestic consensus for 
liberalization.  Mason and Sullivan suggest the US use a similar structural reform 
program in Somalia.  
 
The common thread to this panel was the overall effectiveness of individual civil and 
military projects. While most accomplish tactical objectives defined by the scope of the 
exercise, civil affairs project, or inter-agency activity, the danger exists in that 
strategically, organizations achieve very little if done ad-hoc.  The systems of accounting 
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identified by Piombo and echoed by Farrell & Lee seemed to be lacking in overall 
usefulness, though projects like those undertaken by the Socio-Cultural Research and 
Analysis Teams are movements in the correct direction.  Since the research of these 
three, some changes have been put in placed to make minimal expenditure projects 
more regulated, while the overall development focus of the CJTF-HOA has diminished 
somewhat. Lee and Farrell’s work will help to establish a baseline against which to 
measure strategic progress in years to come. Additionally, the link between 
development and security is not isolated to coordination between interagency forces.  
Mason and Sullivan illustrate that coordination between NGOs and other countries’ 
missions is also crucial to achieving progress in African countries.  Although challenging, 
there is benefit to engaging entities outside the U.S. interagency to gather data and link 
security to development.  
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PANEL SIX:  MARITIME SECURITY AND THE AFRICAN PARTNERSHIP STATION 
 
Panel Six was focused upon maritime security and threat mitigation in Western Africa, 
with a specific case study of U.S. engagements in Ghana and the African Partnership 
Station (APS). Each of these blends security assistance with more developmental 
programs, aimed to increase the African nations' responses to their own security 
threats.  
 
Alison Rimsky Vernon and Margaux Daly first presented the results of their research on 
U.S. engagments with the Ghanaian security forces to enhance maritime security. They 
noted that a common shortfall in the U.S. approach is the way the initiate discussions 
with the Ghanaians, and that U.S. actors had more success in generating quality 
discussions and programs when they attempted to move beyond a U.S.-centric focus. 
The authors recommended the USN focus on establishing maritime security generally, 
and focus on specific types of objectives and activities to accomplish this.  They argued 
that framing the discussion in a way that focuses on Ghanaian concerns would be far 
more constructive for the United States. They recommended that the USN focus efforts 
on 1) establishing general maritime security in Ghana, rather than on mitigating specific 
maritime threats, and 2) facilitate relationships within Ghana and between Ghana and 
its regional partners and advocate for the Ghanaian Navy as a priority for resourcing. 
They also noted that the U.S. military actors should more consciously engage actors and 
inputs outside of the security sector to truly achieve sustainable partner nation security. 
The key is to identify important inputs and then, often in close coordination with other 
agencies and organizations, address them in a way that will influence vital behaviors. By 
doing so, the United States would stand a much greater chance of attaining the 
cooperative security it seeks. 
 
Following the group presentation, Daly spoke about her research on the Africa 
Partnership Station (APS), a multinational maritime engagement coordinated out of U.S. 
Naval Forces Africa in Naples. She found that the activities performed by the U.S. 
military in these missions were tactically successful, but as they are conducted they are 
not sufficient to achieve long-term strategic objectives in terms of developing partner 
capacity in African countries or in reducing threats to the maritime sector in Africa. This 
limitation results, in part, from a misunderstanding of what key inputs and players are 
important in achieving lasting maritime safety and security goals. In her case, the APS 
engagement mission failed to recognize the key role partner nation capability plays in 
creating lasting change, and to substantially engage with the primary actors driving this 
change: the host nation governments. Daly argued that we can use the APS example and 
the difficulties the mission experienced in achieving its strategic objectives, to: 1) 
develop a general model of what is required to achieve objectives, 2) see where the 
inaugural APS mission fell short, and 3) determine how future missions can be designed 
to improve the likelihood of success. 
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Participants and Objectives 
In this panel Alison Rimsky Vernon, Margaux Daly, and Veronica de Allende, Center for  
Naval Analysis, co-presented on maritime threats in Ghana and what role the US and its 
African Partnership Station can play in mitigating those threats.  Margaux Daly then 
presented on achieving cooperative security goals through the APS.  Jason Neal 
moderated the panel. 
 
Panel Narrative 
The first maritime threat examined by the authors was piracy and U.S. efforts to help 
the Ghanaian government to combat piracy.  The presenters reviewed three sets of 
maritime security threats, and noted that U.S. and Ghanaian prioritization of these 
varied widely. While piracy in Ghana is generally not a significant threat, consisting of 
only five percent of all maritime threats in sub-Saharan Africa from 2005-2009, there is a 
spillover threat from Nigeria because pirates have fled from Nigeria to Ghana in recent 
years. In addition, there are energy security threats related to piracy in the region, 
particularly related to the oil sector within Ghana and threats stemming from oil 
bunkering and illegal trafficking in Nigeria. A second threat to Ghana is trafficking, 
including cocaine from South America to Europe; oil from Nigeria to the world; 
cigarettes from Europe and Asia to West and North Africa; counterfeit medicines from 
Asia to West Africa; victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation from West Africa to 
Europe; small arms to West Africa; and toxic waste from Europe to Nigeria and Ghana. 
While trafficking was a major concern for the U.S. embassy in Ghana, it was not a 
priority for the Ghanaian government. Finally, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing can threaten fisheries-based economies and livelihoods. It includes activities 
such as unlicensed fishing/poaching, fishing with illegal gear, going over established 
quotas for fish, or fishing outside of defined seasons, and misreporting or failing to 
report catch data. Similar to narco-trafficking, U.S. and Ghanaian officials perceive and 
prioritize IUU fishing quite differently; with the United States prioritizing the challenges 
more highly than the Ghanaian government (while the Ghanaians affected obviously 
prioritize the problem much more highly than their own government).  
 
The presenters noted that although Ghana has taken some steps to address its maritime 
threats, these have not been sufficient to meet the challenges. The reasons for Ghana’s 
failure to substantially adopt mitigation behaviors include some major constraints: lack 
of awareness, lack of resources, and corruption. There was also a significant problem 
with political will: some of the most influential stakeholders who could influence 
Ghanaian security activities - the President, Parliament, Judiciary and Ministry of 
Finance - had little interest in the maritime sector. Those who did attempt to promote 
maritime security were the Minister of Defence and oil companies, which had the 
potential to be influential, but achieved little success in their efforts. The wider issue 
public for maritime security, had much less influence - the Ghanaian Navy, fisheries, 
ports authorities, the police.   
 
Section Two: Panel Six 
 30 
Because of the differences in how the two governments prioritize specific maritime 
threats, the presenters argued that the USN, and the U.S. embassy in general, would 
find more success if they re-oriented their efforts to discuss establishing maritime 
security generally, and focus on specific types of objectives and activities to accomplish 
this. Framing the discussion in such a way that focuses on Ghanaian concerns will be far 
more constructive for the United States.  Given that U.S. and Ghana priorities vary and 
that resources are not unlimited, they recommended that USN efforts focus on 
increasing general maritime security behaviors in Ghana that can prevent and mitigate 
multiple threats simultaneously. They recommended that the USN also help mentor the 
Ghanaian Navy on how to better lobby for resources within the Ministry of Defense and, 
if possible, to lobby for resources from the Finance Ministry.   
 
Margaux Daly then offered an analysis of the APS based on her time spent with the 
flagships over several years. The Africa Partnership Station (APS) is the institution 
focused on engagement in West and East Africa from U.S. Naval Forces, Africa 
(USNAVAF).  Since its inception in 2007, APS has been focused on creating a safe and 
secure maritime environment in Africa; moreover, the focus has been on helping coastal 
countries to secure the maritime environment themselves, rather than relying on 
outside help. Long-term regional relationship building was a critical aspect of this 
program. The APS sought to offer a forum to establish and inculcate relationships 
among the various countries.   
 
 Daly found that the activities performed by the U.S. military in these missions were 
tactically successful in terms of individual training, but as conducted they were 
insufficient to achieve larger-order strategic objectives. This limitation results, in part, 
from a misunderstanding of what key inputs and players are important in achieving 
lasting maritime safety and security goals. Namely, the APS engagement mission failed 
to recognize the key role partner nation capability plays in creating lasting change, and 
to substantially engage with the primary actors driving this change: the host nation 
governments.   
 
One of the reasons for this neglect of capacity building and host nation engagement, 
Daly argued, was from the ways that U.S. personnel viewed these non-combat 
operations. Daly observed that among the APS staff, some personnel felt that peacetime 
missions were “lesser-included” operations that did not require specific training to 
execute. She noted, however, that although engagement missions may not require the 
level of tactical and technical skill required to fight and win major combat, engagement 
missions can be more complicated to achieve than those of combat operations. Goals 
can be difficult to define; there often is no "adversary" to combat and therefore it is 
difficult for the military to identify "targets" for effects; and the link between 
engagement activities and the accomplishment of desired goals is complex and not 
straightforward.  
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Overall, the APS was more successful in achieving its tactical goal of training partner 
nation maritime forces and in paving the way for future engagement with these nations. 
However, its strategic success was limited, because the APS failed to assist nations to 
increase overall activities in the realm of maritime safety and security in any substantive 
way. APS planners failed to effectively engage a key set of actors (the government) and 
did not appreciate that trained and motivated maritime forces alone are not sufficient 
to achieve maritime security. Daly noted that since its inaugural mission in 2007, the 
APS staff had broadened their efforts to engage a more diverse set of stakeholders in 
the planning and execution of the effort. 
 
A primary finding from the panel was that host nation governments were a necessary 
target actor that need to be influenced to produce resourcing behaviors, and ultimately, 
to achieve cooperative security objectives. This was an insight that was hard-learned for 
the military actors, but, as noted by the civilians in the audience, one that development 
experts have known for decades. Here, the discussions hit on one of the most long-
standing tensions in U.S. military activities that seek to produce devlopmental ends 
(such as capacity building and strategic planning). Military personnel often do not 
understand the political aspects behind partner nation programs and policies, nor do 
they often appreciate the variety of actors that they need to engage with when 
conducting non-kinetic missions. The APS staffs have learned over time to engage more 
broadly, but the presenters noted that a closer interagency effort from the beginning of 
the APS program could have prevented the need to learn these lessons the hard way.  
 
Furthermore, to achieve the objective of long-term, sustainable security, behavioral 
change may be required in two separate sets of partner nation actors: the partner 
nation’s security forces, and the partner nation’s leadership, who are responsible for 
creating and sustaining these forces. Daly in particular suggested that actors and inputs 
outside of security force ability must be more consciously engaged to have any chance 
of influencing and achieving sustainable partner nation security. The key is to identify 
important inputs and then, often in close coordination with other agencies and 
organizations, address them in a way that will influence vital behaviors. By doing so, the 
United States will stand a much greater chance of attaining the cooperative security it 
seeks.  
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PANEL SEVEN:  INTERACTIONS IN THE FIELD  
 
This panel explored communication and relationships between organizations operating 
in the field. The overall theme was that more attention focused on building strong 
relationships interagency relationships will provide better results in the field. Groups 
with similar mission sets often fail to create synergy in their activities, organizations, or 
goals. Some presenters felt that AFRICOM could serve as a central hub for facilitating 
relationship building. 
 
The first presenter, Richard Byess, explored some of the issues that challenge the civil-
military relationship; outlined the feasibility of an integrated civilian-military approach 
to security and development; addressed the limitations or challenges of an integrated 
approach; and made recommendations for overcoming these limitations. He focused on 
the miscommunication dilemma created when different agencies have divergent 
definitions of and assumptions about issues such as security and humanitarian 
development.  In addition to the communication gaps, he emphasized coordination 
challenges created by cultural and organizational diversity between organizations, 
particularly USAID and the U.S. military.   
 
G. William Anderson also focused on communication problems. Along with having 
difficulties speaking the same language, agencies need to actually open the lines of 
communication between each other.  He addressed the misperceptions that exist in 
regards to organizational capabilities and programs between USAID and the DoD. He 
also discussed the differences each organization has for planning.   Anderson argued 
that a  process like security sector reform, for example, involves more than just building 
a functional military, it requires the construction of foundational institutions that are 
necessary in order for a military to be successful. He argued that two of the principal 
challenges facing the US Government in Africa are (1) achieving sustained post-conflict 
reconstruction and stabilization and (2) developing more effective approaches and 
institutions for conflict and crisis prevention. These challenges require greater 
cooperation among partner agencies within the US government.  
 
The final presenters were Teresa Crawford from Partners for Democratic Change and 
Trina Zwicker, from AFRICOM.  They presented a co-authored paper on why AFRICOM 
needs an NGO outreach strategy, and emphasized that such a strategy was necessary 
because Africa Command was interacting with a wide variety of civilian organizations at 
a variety of levels and on a diverse number of issues. They recommended that command 
staff work with the DoD to fix the structural issues that limit their interaction with 
NGOs.  Improving structural conditions could include: articulation of a clear strategy; 
deepened understanding of NGOs; broadened outreach to additional NGOs; and 
improved information sharing between headquarters and field / in-country staff. 
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Participants and Objectives 
In this panel Richard Byess and Gene Bonaventre, United States Agency for International 
Development co-presented on achieving stability and development in AFRICOM. G. 
William Anderson, Virginia Tech University, presented on how USAID and DoD can work 
together more effectively in Africa. Teresa Crawford and Trina Zwicker, Partners for 
Democratic Change in AFRICOM, presented on why AFRICOM needs an NGO outreach 
strategy. Gustav Jordt moderated the panel. 
 
Panel Narrative 
The first presenter, Richard Byess explored some of the issues that challenge the civil-
military relationship; outlined the feasibility of an integrated civilian-military approach 
to security and development; addressed the limitations or challenges of an integrated 
approach; and finally offered some suggestions for overcoming these limitations. 
 
Byess suggested that dialogue is key to achieving stability. He began by asking the 
workshop participants  to define security. The group realized there was not a single 
definition that could be agreed upon amongst them, even though all were experts in 
both development and security.  Byess emphasized that language and context of words 
obscured the security-development nexus. Stabilization, he suggested, is an ambiguous 
term with no concrete definition.  Similarly, what is a "humanitarian" effort" To USAID 
and the developmental community, humanitarian action is not building a school, as 
many military personnel define humanitarian operations. Instead, non-military actors 
define humanitarian efforts as emergency initiatives to save lives. He suggested that 
calling everything humanitarian leads to misuse of the term.  His bottom line 
assessment is that agencies need to come to a common understanding of terms and use 
them appropriately. 
 
Byess suggested that organizations need to know their "customers" in order to be 
effective. More joint planning should be done; for example USAID should be involved in 
the development of DoD theater objectives so that they understand what the Pentagon 
is doing. He suggested that if the U.S. government is going to be serious about Africa, 
then we need to be serious about intent, objectives, and measures of effectiveness. 
Better representatives—from DoD to country teams—are needed that have an idea 
what interagency relations consist of.  
 
The next presenter was Bill Anderson  focusing on how USAID and the DoD can work 
together more effectively.  He argued that in Africa, two of the principal challenges 
facing the US Government were (1) achieving sustained post-conflict reconstruction and 
stabilization and (2) developing more effective approaches and institutions for conflict 
and crisis prevention. These challenges required greater cooperation among partner 
agencies within the US government than occurred. He explored the overall question of 
how USAID and DoD can work together more effectively in Africa to strengthen weak 
and fragile states and prevent or mitigate conflict. He discussed a series of key questions 
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concerning opportunities, risks, and obstacles, and lessons learned about USAID-DoD 
collaboration in Africa, focusing principally on USAID-DoD relationships at the COCOM 
level (AFRICOM) and country team levels.    
 
Anderson noted that calls for interagency cooperation have created a perception that 
foreign assistance is being militarized. Lack of coordination with missions in the field 
leaves many NGOs worried about how the military presence threatens them. Anderson 
emphasized that civilian agencies must do their part to build strong accountable 
institutions, so that militarization cannot occur. Within this discussion, Anderson noted 
that Congress' failure to commit to rebuilding USG civilian capabilities was a key 
constraint in creating the true interagency coordination that is necessary to address 
development and security in Africa.  
 
Anderson then presented some possibilities for creating opportunities for interagency 
integration and cooperation.  He suggested that a secure and stable environment is 
critical for success and then offered some important questions to consider: Can the DoD 
succeed in building a professional military in Africa? Can DoD build institutions from 
scratch? What is the systematic approach?  
 
The next presenters were Crawford and Zwicker.  The two first worked together as 
AFRICA Command attempted to build a comprehensive approach towards sustainable 
development that built on the unique relationships between military and development 
NGOs. Their paper focused on the civil / military interactions between staff and offices 
at AFRICOM. 
 
Zwicker gave a brief overview of AFRICOM’s mission and outreach efforts that fell under 
AFRICOM's Outreach Directorate, which was at the time split into two divisions: 
strategic communications and partnership. The outreach program was tasked with 
expanding relationships between military and NGOs as well as addressing challenges 
that arose in the field and within bureaucracies.  One of the largest challenges for them 
was trying to reconcile the interaction and communication gap between military forces 
and NGOs. Groups with similar mission sets often failed to create synergy in their 
activities, organizations, or goals. Levels of engagement existed along strategic, 
humanitarian, planning, tactical program implementation, and information / outreach, 
and Zwicker suggested that Africa Command could serve as a lead, co-convener with 
others, or a participant in each of these arenas. 
 
The presenters suggested there were many questions left remaining as Africa Command 
endeavors to build a more cohesive approach.  These questions include: 1) are there 
particular sectors where Africa Command could focus their NGO outreach efforts? 2) 
What improvements or innovations would make it easier to coordinate with NGOs and 
across communities in countries where Africa Command is working? 3) What could 
other U.S. agencies do to improve the perception of Africa command among NGOs? 4) 
What concerns do African NGOs have about Africa Command? Are some NGOs more 
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open than others to working with the military? 5) Given the current constraints on 
Africa Command/NGO interaction, would it be better for Africa Command to focus on 
improving the work they are currently doing with certain NGOs rather than expanding 
the engagement to a wider NGO community? 
 
Overall, the presenters conclude that Africa Command is interacting with civilian 
organizations to include NGOs, at a variety of levels and on a diverse number of issues. 
They recommend that command staff work with the DoD to fix the structural issues that 
limit their interaction with NGOs.  Improving structural conditions could include: 
articulation of a clear strategy; deepened understanding of NGOs; broadened outreach 
to additional NGOs; and improved information sharing between headquarters and field 
/ in-country staff. 
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PANEL EIGHT – SECURITY SECTOR SUPPORT AND CAPACITY BUILDING 
 
This panel examined security sector reform as a microcosm of development and 
security. The panelists all embraced an expansive conception of security, looking beyond 
states and military institutions. Security sector reform not only requires internal 
capacity building from a “bottom-up” perspective, but also external support through 
resource acquisition, training, and advice on design.  All the panelists emphasized that 
relying upon traditional notions of security in Africa may serve to undermine security 
sector reform if governmental institutions are weak, corrupt, or non-existent as 
evidenced in conflict zones such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  A 
reconceptualization of security at the human level can move past problems rooted in 
bad governance, uneven development, exclusion, and rights abuses at the state level. 
However, panelists noted that it is often difficult for military actors to embrace and 
operationalize programs that help to enhance human, rather than state security.  
 
Despite this, AFRICOM has come to take on both traditional and human security roles. 
The focus on human security, panelists noted, directed attention to the imbalance 
between civilian and military resources that created a gap between policy objectives 
and outcomes. This imbalance has necessitated an expansion of the military’s 
jurisdiction into traditionally and internationally accepted civilian realms, which has 
spawned most of the recent debate on the creeping militarization of US foreign policy.  
 
  
Participants and Objectives 
In this panel Dustin Sharp, University of San Diego, presented on accountability and  
impunity in West Africa. Andrea M. Walther, Development Alternatives Incorporated, 
presented on the role of AFRICOM in security sector reform. Cliff Keller, US Army Special 
Operations Command Headquarters, presented on building grassroots sovereignty in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Laura Perazzola moderated the panel. 
 
Panel Narrative 
Sharp argued that in many African countries the security sector itself—those actors and 
institutions with the central charge of providing defense and security—have too often 
become a persistent source of insecurity through acts of corruption, extortion, 
criminality, and various human rights abuses. When such abuses are allowed to go 
unchecked over time, protectors become predators, operating in some instances with 
near total impunity. Without accountability for corruption and human rights abuses, the 
rule of law is undermined, and the prospects for advancing development and security 
are diminished.  Given this, security sector "reform" programs that focus on building the 
capacity of security forces will only create more problems if they are not embedded in 
larger-order governance programs. Therefore, when addressing the security-
development nexus in West Africa today, international actors must include greater 
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efforts to close this accountability gap in the traditional security sector. Far from being 
peripheral to the security-development nexus, issues of accountability and impunity for 
human rights abuses must be brought to the center of thinking and programming in 
areas of peace operations, development, and security and justice sector reform.  
 
Sharp continued by suggesting that given the complexity and diversity of the security 
threats present in West Africa, it would be naïve to assume a military or traditional 
security solution. This is the crux of the development-security nexus when viewed 
through the lens of security sector reform programs. Examples from the Niger delta and 
elsewhere suggest that security problems rooted in bad governance, uneven 
development, exclusion, and rights abuses require a comprehensive package of reforms 
and interventions. Where there is no political will to pursue justice for human rights 
abuses, and where security forces are complicit or themselves perpetrators, impunity 
sets in.  
 
Given this, a paradigm shift from traditional to human security at the policy level could 
help to (re)conceptualize problems of accountability and impunity by traditional security 
sector actors in two ways. First, by taking a holistic and people-centered approach to 
security, focused on the needs of the individual and not just the state, the human 
security lens helps us to see abuses by security forces as among those dire security 
threats, which must be addressed in order for overall security to be advanced. In 
addressing these threats to individuals, state security will ultimately be strengthened 
insofar as mechanisms and institutions that foster accountability are reinforced. Second, 
a re-orientation of traditional West African security forces to better enable them to 
address a fuller range of human security issues, as opposed to just regime security, 
could itself help to improve the broader human rights picture in West Africa today by 
refocusing security actors on the proper beneficiaries of the security they are supposed 
to provide. This initiative includes a focus on “bottom-up” citizen-led initiatives to 
pressure local governments and security sector institutions for accountability and 
reform. 
 
The next presenter, Andrea Walther, analyzed security sector reform (SSR) in Africa and 
the role and consequences of US Africa Command in the SSR process. Based on her work 
with the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership, Walther argued that while some 
tangible steps have been taken to advance overall US SSR efforts, they still lack a 
comprehensive and coordinated government effort.  Echoing points raised by several 
other participants, she noted that the obvious imbalance that exists between civilian 
and military resources has created a gap between policy objectives and programmatic 
application of societal transformation. One leg of the US security sector assistance triad 
(DoD-USAID-DoS) is much more prominent than the others as DoD resources 
dramatically outweigh that of DoS and USAID. This imbalance has necessitated an 
expansion of the military’s jurisdiction into traditionally and internationally accepted 
civilian realms, which has spawned most of the recent debate on the creeping 
militarization of US foreign policy.  
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The third presenter, Keller, proposed an organizational and operational model for how 
Special Operations Forces could assist in improving both security and development in 
failed states and under-governed spaces, with a particular focus on the DRC.  His paper 
described how social capital and national civic identity could be built, or rebuilt, through 
prudent development of partner nation SOF capabilities, rather than through direct U.S. 
military involvement.  It described what that partner nation SOF force would look like, 
and what it would be configured to do.  He focused on the DRC, but concluded with a 
discussion of how his proposed model could be adapted to other states and under-
governed areas in Africa. 
 
Keller argued that greater effectiveness in building partner nation capacity (whether for 
counterinsurgency or development projects) can be achieved by reducing direct U.S. 
involvement and increasing U.S. advisory (not training) activities focused on teaching 
the partner nation to teach themselves. He concentrates on how such forces would be 
configured, trained, and advised in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since it 
represents a particularly challenging test case.  It is so large and broken that no current 
“whole-of-government” approach could possibly work. (Here, he interestingly 
contradicted the sentiments of several participants who had argued that a whole of 
government approach is necessary in a situation like the DRC because creating security 
forces without government institutions to control them would create more problems.)  
Instead, it begs a significantly different design, but one that could potentially be 
adopted in other failed states. 
 
Keller proposed a model in which African governments would be helped to build a corps 
of small, networked, self-sufficient Operational Groups as the core of the special 
operations forces. This distributed model would be appropriated for countries like the 
DRC where there is very little functional central infrastructure. Keller argued that SOF 
could actually help generate the human and social capital that would facilitate the 
spread of other government functions. By focusing on establishing the functions of 
governance instead of the bureaucracy of government, this program would enhance the 
responsiveness and legitimacy of the partner nation.  The development programs of the 
partner nation SOF must be based on an analysis of local requirements and not on the 
preferences of the Operational Groups.  If the projects are not relevant to local 
conditions, and not locally sustainable, then even the most “productive” partner nation 
SOF will fail to expand good governance and sovereignty.  At the same time, simply 
assessing needs accurately is not sufficient.  The partner nation SOF has to be organized 
in such a way as to assist locals to address them.  Sustainability, it was argued, cannot 
be accomplished in any other way. 
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PANEL NINE: HEALTH PROGRAMS 
 
The ninth and last panel focused on the differences between interagency relationships 
and cooperation that impede upon the development of health programs in Africa. As 
the DoD increased its involvement in complex development or development-like 
activities, military involvement in medical engagements rose as well.  
 
As noted in previous panels, these presenters discussed how the relationship between 
the military and NGOs is a point of contention due to different capabilities and the 
assumptions that these organizations make about each other. Each type of organization 
has different methods in which to perform medical engagements and both NGOs and 
the military have assumptions about the other organization, which impedes 
cooperation. Despite the challenges, however, each of the presenters were able to 
identify instances of cooperation and the cooperation of multiple agencies to achieve 
medical assistance. By understanding the limitations and strengths of each organization, 
more can be achieved in terms of medical engagements. The military does have more 
flexibility in its operations and can turn around money faster than USAID.  The military 
can be used to fill the gaps where NGOs and DoS are unable, whether due to funding 
issues or security.  DoS and USAID programs need to be more flexible in order to 
address crises quickly.  All organizations need to understand the other organizations and 
use each other’s strengths to achieve a common goal. 
 
Another major theme of the panel was the ability to understand each agency's culture. 
One panelist focused on the Pandemic Response Program(PRP), a DoD program,  that 
was designed like a USAID program. By structuring the program in a way that USAID 
could easily interact with, AFRICOM's planners made funding and cooperation amongst 
the agencies easier to achieve.   
 
Finally, panelists reviewed some options for how the military can serve as a gap filler 
where (for various reasons) NGOs or DoS cannot function. A number of 
recommendations were offered: “coordinate but differentiate” between organizations 
with each undertaking complementary duties; establish a coordinating body to serve as 
an intermediary; streamline USG funding for health assistance; and develop clear policy 
roles for agencies working on health programs. This panel concluded by trying to focus 
on each individual agency’s strength and using that to fill gaps in weakness.  
 
 
Participants and Objectives 
In this panel Diana B. Putman, United States Africa Command, presented on 
implementing quasi-developmental programs in Africa. Marla Haims, Gene Bonaventre 
and C. Ross Anthony, RAND Corporation, co-presented on the relationship between DoD 
and NGOs in complex development and how to enhance the effectiveness of US 
government health assistance. Gustav Jordt moderated the panel. 
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Panel Narrative 
Haims, Bonaventre, and Anthony presented on the complex relationships between DoD 
and NGOs operating in fragile, failed, or post-conflict states.  The presenters first 
introduced what complex development is and how it differs from humanitarian relief or 
disaster response efforts. They argued that “development” should be defined activities 
that deliver or enhance the local capacity to deliver essential services in fragile, failed, or 
post conflict states (otherwise referred to as complex development) crippled by some 
combination of extreme poverty, insecurity and weak government.  
 
Working with this definition, the Department of Defense has scaled up complex 
development activities.  With the potential confusion among locals on the ground, along 
with overall different skill sets, cultures, missions, goals, and methods, it is not 
surprising that the DoD and NGOs have found forging a cooperative relationship 
difficult. Yet such civilian-military relationships are critical for pursuing a U.S. foreign 
policy that carefully balances defense, development, and diplomacy.    
 
The presenters argued that the DoD can play a unique role in filling a gap that NGOs 
cannot meet due to security situations or resource shortfalls. The Rand study looked at 
two separate complex environments— post-conflict reconstruction (typically a non-
permissive, or insecure environment) and pure counterinsurgency/counterterrorism 
(typically a more permissive, or secure environment). In it, the authors examined 
perceived and actual barriers contributing to the tension between the groups; gleaned 
insights from instances of good coordination; and offered a feasible, preliminary set of 
recommendations for improved U.S. government effectiveness in health assistance 
through more effective NGO-DoD relationships. 
 
The authors focused on the following lessons learned. 
 
1) DoD and NGOs conducted similar activities in shared space, but had different 
objectives.  On one side the DoD viewed development as a means to an end—to gain 
access, influence, and information from a host nation. On the other side, NGOs sought 
to reduce suffering, transition to development, and build capacity. Moreover NGOs 
provided longer-term fundamental assistance, whereas DoD provided short-term 
instrumental assistance. 
 
2) The DoD’s health assistance activities were difficult to quantify and qualify. The lack 
of clarity to Medical Stability Operations and the limited dedicated health assistance 
programs the DoD offers showcased a general lack of strategic objectives for health 
assistance and related policies and programs from the DoD.   
 
3) Different organizational traits and cultures created challenges (by this point in the 
workshop, a much-raised point).  The different organizational cultures of DoD and 
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NGOs—the former being hierarchical and the latter being loosely structured—presents 
coordination challenges in shared spaces. The DoD did not organize, train or equip solely 
for development missions.  Moreover, within the DoD staff turnover rapidly inhibited 
relationship building, while propensity for risk prevented many DoD elements from 
living off bases, thus separating them from the locals.  
 
4) Several assumptions impeded the DoD-NGO relationship.  Among DoD officials, one 
assumption was that security cannot be accomplished without engaging in development 
activities. Another was that quick impact projects would win hearts and minds among 
locals.  A third was that NGOs were generally the same—disorganized, slow and 
ineffective. Among NGOs, the assumptions included: if they were associated with the 
military they would become targets; NGO association with the military will jeopardize 
independence and trust which could impede the mission; and that the military lacked 
the knowledge, expertise, and proper orientation to perform development activities 
well. 
 
The presenters provided a number of recommendations:  
1) the USG should clearly define policies and agency roles for health assistance; 
2) the United States should streamline USG funding for health assistance;  
3) there is a need to establish a coordinating body to function as an intermediary 
between DoD and NGOs; 
4)the  DoD and NGOs should “coordinate but differentiate;” 
5) the DoD should consider organizational changes to better support USG health 
assistance; and  
6) both the DoD and NGOs should institute related training and education requirements. 
 
The next presenter was Diana Putman, a senior USAID official who had headed the 
Humanitarian Assistance branch at AFRICOM for several years (following her assignment 
at AFRICOM, Putman became the head of USAID in the DRC). Putman argued that while 
many of AFRICOM's programs have been successful, there remain many challenges as 
the command endeavored to integrate its non-DoD members into its plans and 
operations.  These included differences in organizational cultures and planning 
processes.  Putman suggested additional steps to improve interagency integration 
within the Command.   
 
She reviewed one program that had achieved remarkable success in promoting 
coordination between the DoD and USAID: The Partner Military HIV/AIDS Program, or 
PMHAP. PMHAP was an interagency, military to military initiative in charge of the 
Department of Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program in Africa. The program was 
successful because it was truly integrated into broader host nation and USG HIV/AIDS 
programming. Other USG agencies appreciated that it served a distinct population (host 
nation military), which they could not fund, so it filled a specific niche and did not 
compete with their programs.  Additionally, in some countries military medical 
establishments served the broader civilian community, which provided spillover 
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assistance from the military program, providing services to populations that might 
otherwise have been missed. 
 
Putman noted that the DoD's HAO (Humanitarian Assistance-Other) program was the 
one that had raised the most controversy. It’s Congressionally-stipulated regulations 
forced it to predict what it would need for disaster relief.  Bad predictions resulted 
either in unspent funds at the end of the year or pulling funds from steady-state 
programs.  This hampered relationship building. Under the Bush Administration, many 
HAO projects had been justified as part of the Global War on Terror policy, but there 
was less emphasis on that since 2008.  HAO projects wre intended to benefit 
disadvantaged or marginalized civilian populations and address basic human needs, but 
did not need to be attached to broader disaster responses, as they would be if 
conducted by the NGO community.  HAO policy guidance states that projects are not 
supposed to involve economic development activities because that is USAID’s 
responsibility.  In some countries with limited or no USAID presence, or where use of 
other funds are constrained by Congressional intent, however, HAO has been an 
extremely useful tool for the Defense Attache and/or Ambassador, who at times utilized 
HAO programs as substitutes for USAID projects.  
 
The idea of organizational and cultural differences amongst organizations reoccured 
frequently in this panel.  Panelists and participants noted that, in Africa negative feelings 
between NGOS and the military surface much less than in Afghanistan and Iraq.  All the 
panelists were able to identify good instances of cooperation and using multiple 
agencies to achieve medical assistance.   By understanding the limitations and strengths 
of each organization, more can happen in terms of medical engagements.  The military 
does have more flexibility in its operations and can turn around money much more 
quickly than USAID.  The military can be used to fill the gaps where NGOs and DoS are 
unable, whether due to funding issues or security.  This panel concluded with a 
discussion of the issues of flexibility within the DoS and its programs.  
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